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20210609. There is no strong point in arguing.

When a believer believes, say, in God, one believes without arguments even though one may try to find some.

When a doubter doubts, it’s the same.

We are accostumed to think about arguments as reasons, but arguments should be points.

There is hardly a use for arguing in favor of a reason if there is no evidencer for it – unless this reason is not-evident for itself (oterwise it would’nt be a dispute) yet it’s demonstrable [there is a truth or a point within a not-so-evident (for some) argument that can be brought to light, that is, brought to the understanding (of this some)].

So most of the time truths or arguments aren’t needed to believe, in fact, it’s seldom the case that believers have arguments. No evidence to this is needed since there are 2 acknowledgable facts: 1. it’s historical that most of the times people have been wrong, have believed in wrong things and made unsucessful decisions (religious, traders and suicidal sects are good examples) 2. even if you don’t like my point because you are one of these people, i recommend you to just watch TV or bring about some digital social media, there you find plenty of misinformation, incorrect beliefs and pseudoscientific ou pseudorational statements.

The very fact that people don’t demand arguments or points or evidences to form beliefs;

                        that people don’t check information whatsoever;

  that people are moved by impressions, moral standards and emotions more than by facts, logic and reasonable opinions (and many other facts that I omit for the sake of brevity) lead us to the conclusion that:

Barking is usuallly more effective than arguing. I rest my case. May he or she or it rest in peace.


I eat not much so i do not hinder the world.


I am a scientist of people.

Strawson, 1994 brings about a good point: ‘The ‘mind-body problem’ divides into a hard part and an easy part. The hard part is the problem of how experience or consciousness can be wholly physical—although this is a hard problem only given standard assumptions about the nature of the physical (e.g. that the basic nature of the physical is non-experiential or non-conscious). The rest of the mind-body problem is easy: even given standard/traditional assumptions about the nature of the physical, no other hard problems arise from the fact that mind is something wholly physical.’ De <>

For the next eight or ten paragraphs i will be somnolent (to you, my reader), because i’ve noted that sleepy i have been (to myself) – i created to you this small preface to advice as i came from a day later. So, i’m not sure i expressed myself as i would with the ful power of my mind. I also realized it may be fruitfull to decide on a language to write, otherwise this is Babel. Everything is Babel, because there is a language inside a language, and infinite infinitesimals fractals of language within a language, but, as Cantor already guessed, one thing is to deal with the infinite, but two infinites are indeed double trouble.

There is trouble when philosophers try to solve real life problems (unless these philosophers are either Spinoza, Nietzsche or the Stoics). Specially those that insist in bringing to clarity issues that are not clear by themselves. What could clarify them is evidence, but philosophers don’t have evidence of their own, they usuallly rely only on thought experiments (ideas so impossible that actually cannot be tested), reasoning, and of course, the most useful but still insufficient of them all, definition of concepts.

Strawson does it. I liked that he dedicated part of his life to it, because it’s a further attempt to make a point less scary. I will come about. Let me first adress his approach: to consider that a mind is an epifenomeon of a body is more rational and feasible than explaining that there is matter and there is a transcendent spirit (is this an Ockham solution?). This spirit connects to matter in an unknown form (such to move bodies). But what does he say? Its all of the time mere wordplay: if you don’t consider a problem that something physical as a body can have something mental as a mind, you call no objection to a body being, causing or at least being the host of a mind. It’s more difficult in a world of bodies to believe in something as a transcendental spirit, so we are better off just calling it even that bodies bring about minds, because bodies have and process perceptions and a perception of a perception may be the reflexivity that creates conscience. Hardly nobody dispute the facts that animated bodies move because they have volition, and the most complex of them have minds to mediate these volitions in (pretensely) adequate actions considering the context. There is nothing wrong conceptually about any ideas that form the basic opinion of people (conscience as effect of mind as effect of body is a plausible explanation; a transcendental spirit incarnated in a body is, in my opinion, less plausible, but still we cannot say that isn’t plausible at all). They usually only disagree regarding if a mind dies when the body dies or not.

Conscience is physical because experience is physical. Experience is physical because it is or derives from a body being in the world and sensing it, perceiving it, respondingo whith emotions to it, trying to grasp it, and have intuitions about existent and non-existent things.

‘The unique ,however, has no content; it is indeterminacy initself; only

Through you

Does it acquire content and determination.’

‘The unique, on the other hand ,is a concept That lacks determination and cannot be made determinate by other concepts or receive a “nearer content”; it is not the “principle of a series of concepts,” but a word or concept that,as word or concept, is not capable of any development. (Stirner 2012: 56)’

Tem um ponto bem claro sobre fisicalidades. Cores são atributos como texturas ou cheiros são atributos. Em geral pensamos objetos como entes consistentes (materiais, relativamente densos) , quem detém certa textura: pense no chão (conjunto de solo), na água (que gela, que corre no rio ou que evapora). Isto é são coisas sólidas líquidas ou gasosas que possuem ou adquirem uma forma. Nessa visão uma cor ou cheiro dificilmente pode ser descrito como um corpo – um material. Penso mais na cor, mas eu queria outro exemplo. Porque a cor é mais um aspecto do que uma essência. O camaleão muda de cor, e de noite eu não sei qual é a cor da arvore porque não há luz que nela se reflita ou absorva. O que isso quer dizer? a cor é um atributo da luz, não da arvore nem do camaleão, a interação de um e outro transparece uma cor específica. se temos facilidade em admitir que objetos tem cores apesar de não serem nem se resumirem nem poderão ser suficientemente descritos com essas cores, por que temos dificuldade de admitir que uma mente seja um atributo de um corpo?

Self: ‘subject of experience’ to Strawson.

O uso de entes inobserváveis para explicar eventos e comportamentos é altamente problemático. Embora eu entenda e ache proveitoso crença, sentido, atitude, pensamento… Eles não são observáveis, então o que faz com que eu os entenda? Primeiro a experiência. Depois o sentido atribuível de cada termo, tal como ele é sentido em cada experiência.  Mas eu creio que é diferente eu experimentar e conceptualizar uma crença, um desejo e uma emoção – afinal eu realmente as experencio, de alguma forma – do que supor que existem cordas que movem átomos. Qual é a diferença? Eu observo a crença mesma – muito embora só a acesse com símbolos, tais como palavras – são mediadores. Eu não tenho nada para observar, sequer indiretamente, as cordas – apenas os seus supostos efeitos – o movimento. Neste sentido é diferente eu me conhecer desde dentro e ver vários atributos mentais que podem explicar o meu comportamento do que ver o comportamento de outro – posso supô-lo um autômato, posso supô-lo alguém análogo a mim, de qualquer modo não acesso tampouco suas crenças, desejos e pensamentos – embora possa inferi-los, tanto pelo comportamento observável, tanto por analogia (conhecimentos que adquiri por introspecção e observação de outros).

‘the fact is that there is, as Cicero says, “no statement so absurd that no philosopher will make it” (44, 2.58.119). He explicitly says that he doesn’t know why this is so, but he knows it is so. Descartes agrees in 1637: “nothing can beimagined which is too strange or incredible to have been said by some philosopher”(Descartes, 1637, p. 118). Louise Antony agrees in 2007: “there is … no banalityso banal that no philosopher will deny it” (Antony, 2007, p. 114). The mischievousThomas Reid agrees: “there is nothing so absurd which some philosophers havenot maintained” (Reid, 1785, p. 124). 27 De <>

‘Descartes has more to say: when it comes to speculative matters, he says, “the scholar (…) will take (…) the more pride [in his views] the further they are from common sense (…), since he will have had to use so much more skill and ingenuityin trying to render them plausible” (Descartes, 1637, p. 115). He reckons that “thosewho have never studied judge much more reliably and clearly about salient mattersthan those who have spent all their time in the Schools” (Descartes, 1618-28, p.16). C. D. Broad agrees, 300 years later: some ideas are “so preposterously silly that only very learned men could have thought of them” (Broad, 1925, p. 623).’ De <>

“Long indulgence in error makes right thinking almost impossible”, as WilliamJames observes (James, 1890, p. 521).’ De <>

These facts are surely part of the explanation of why, as Hobbes notes, “arguments seldom work on men of wit and learning when they have once engaged themselvesin a contrary opinion” (Hobbes, 1645, p. 41)’ De <>

‘Once again I turn to Russell.Philosophers can say something this absurd, he says, writing in 1940, because they have “a long training in absurdity” (Russell, 1940, p. 116). Russell thinks in fact,that there are things that “only philosophers with a long training in absurdity couldsucceed in believing” (Russell, 1940, p. 116)’


‘Van Gogh não se sentou sob o céu de uma noite estrelada para pintar somente aquilo que via’  De <> ‘

Eu diria que obrar artisticamente objetiva a subjetividade, trazendo à sensação aquilo que de outra forma ficaria no pensamento, no sentimento, na imaginação ou na intuição – é um fraseamento junguiano. Veja como um winicottiano diz: ‘

A arte é uma realização – encontra suporte no real – de algo do mundo interno. No entanto, não é nem puramente real nem puramente imaginado; é uma experiência transicional.’ De <>

A arte consumida pode ser uma intermediação ou tradução de um elemento subjetivo a ser sentido, entendido, intuído, imaginado, catarsizado ou incorporado. A produção artística também, por via ativa (motora).

But perhaps we may influence those want to teach if we use a moving point. Start with an emotional point says Rosenberg. Like  Florence Nightingale did, with two simple images. Was it the statistic or was actually art?

This first picture made her famous. She became the lady with the lamp. An… Icon! A symbol! Simply as she stood for something. And then of course was seen and believed and praised.

I cannot speak for anyone else, you may call it a diagram, i call it art.

With this illustrations she made her point more than intelligible – visualizable.

It was a renascent dawn of the image as a point?

Colocar em palavras, em perspectiva, o que sentimos e exteriorizar isso é uma das melhores formas de evitar que nossas angústias somatizem. Vamos descobrindo o sentido no percurso e após um certo caminhar é que conseguimos entender melhor o que se passou.

Florence, an example of nurse made a litlle bit further: she put down in numbers, in time, in cause and then, not only comparing and giving dimension, but basically bringing to eye. What is seen hardly can be doubted: it takes madnesses or reliable knowledge to do so. A point is not na argument.

To point:

‘direct someone’s attention toward something by extending one’s finger or something held in one’s hand.

“the boys were nudging each other and pointing at me” De <>

We can make na appointment.

A point is na unity of measure. ‘

mark or unit for countingespecially how much a person or team has scored in a sport: De <>

In the music, ‘an important phrase or subject, especially in a contrapuntal composition.’

De <>

Or even better: ‘Counterpoint is the art of weaving together independent melodies in order to produce a beautiful, harmonious whole. Each part is tuneful and interesting in itself, and when parts are combined with each other, we hear the result as harmony. The music then, has both a horizontal and a vertical aspect.’ De <>

Isn’t it what i am doing here?

If we appoint or if we make a point, we indicate.

Diogenes didn’t write, but his appointments survived.

If one points out, one may give context to something.

A point is not an argument, but ‘the meaning or most important part of what someone says or writes:’ De <>

Something worth of consideration: ‘an opinion or fact that deserves to be considered seriously,’ De <>

What is beside the point is evidently not the point: ‘not important or not related to the subject being discussed:’ De <>

A point is an interstice of a process: ‘a particular time or stage reached in a process:’

De <>

a particular step, stage, or degree in developmenthad reached the point where nothing seemed to matter anymore’ De <>

Or the point is a brink:

‘a time interval immediately before something indicated VERGEat the point of death’

De <>

The point is the precisement  of a needed or useful thing:

‘a particular place:

the point where the road bends

This is a good point from which to watch the race.

 boiling, melting, freezing, etc. point

the temperature at which a substance boilsmeltsfreezes, etc.’

De <>

The point is the sense itself to a particular perspective:

purpose or usefulness:

[ + -ing verb ] informal There’s no point arguing about it – we’re going and that’s that.

I’d like to write to him, but what’s the point? He never writes back.

see little point in discussing this further.’ De <>

A point is the sharp limiar of na edge: ‘the sharp end of something, such as a knife:’ De <>

The point gives us direction: ‘a mark on a compass that shows direction, such as northsoutheast, and west

‘to hold something out in the direction of someone or something:

He said that the man had pointed a knife at him.’

If something points in a particular direction, it is turned towards that direction:

The road sign points left.

All the cars were pointing in the same direction.

There was an arrow pointing to the door.’ De <>

Um conjunto de palavras pode muito bem ser um discurso ou um texto.

Mas um conjunto de palavras que reflete uma experiência são significados apreendíveis através de uma linguagem semicompartilhada (que pode, em geral, ser apreendida). Ela ganha outro estatuto, o de depoimento.

Conhecer razoavelmente a linguagem, acessar razoável e emocionalmente estes significados é portanto acessar (desde dentro, subjetivamente, simbolicamente) uma experiência que não é a sua. E mesmo a mais simples ficção é capaz de nos fazer chorar – não?

O simulacro de um depoimento, uma narrativa inventada. É isto uma ficção – uma história criada para um propósito. E não me venham com a arte não tem propósito, não caio nesta, não.

An art has more points than any other entis.

Há um devaneio em cada coisa

Esperando ser navegado.

Um sonho dentro de um sonho

Porque a subjetividade é fractal.

I cannot grasp the nature of consciousness, but i don’t need to.

There is hardly a point in philosophy. I say this in awe because i admire philosophy. I fear it may be substituted by good dictionary-makers.

  • Are philosophers constantly invoking unuseful doubts? I appreciate their didatics when they have some. Spinoza hasn’t. Nietzsche has. But then i appreciate the professor within the philosopher. What about the philosopher? I learn with Nietzsche and Diogenes and Epictetus and Heraclitus. How, why, and what? I guess i learn attitudes. Its hardly about consciousness. I learn insight, i guess. I read their work as depoiments, testimonials. Its about experience, not orientation, not explanation, not… Even spinoza, almost a dictionary-maker, i see his living, i aprehend his thinking, i grasp how he tackle emotions. By his horns. Im interested in ethics, not linguistics. The language of our dreams is to be created, my friends.

A dream which carries a dream is a pregnant one.

I’m interested in how to live not in how to say. Not semantics. Hermeneutics, ok. What it means.

Phenomenology is the only possible method of reality grasping. There’s no other thing than appearences. But phenomenology is a dead end. The epoche must itself, at some point, be suspendend. In the point of eating or sleeping, for instance.

Its good to confront oneself with other perspectives. What would a rationalist say? What  would an anthropologist?

As Socrates showed us, he pointed out, questioning advances more than lecturing. Questions are themselves points.

This is more reflexive i guess than just a collage of quotations. Hypomnematas are to be reread. The aid of attitude, through the observation of one’s own reflection. Subjectivity objetified. A shot is a phrase. A stream of phrases is a movie. I don’t think of thoughts, as i write them they become something else: vivid, solid, maneuverable. They become something existing, for me and for many. Anyone can acess it and make something else of it.

Of course i will be defeated.

But of course i will try until there is will.

To think is not to move

But to act it is.

To say or to show or to illustrate

Is to move.

Think out loud, may

Your thinking be allowed.

Otherwise it will be sinking.

Be an existentialist!

Only what exists can be essential.

Portuguese is closer to the close ones

But English may reach more people.

And i usually read in English so its almost

Pointless either quote in english without translating

Or commentating in portuguese a text that is in english.

But it’s true that some phrases come out more naturally in some language.


Publicado por ghfranco

Psicólogo e Escritor. Possui "Master of Arts" em Antropologia Social pela Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität-Alemanha (2015) e graduação em Psicologia pela Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (2006). Atualmente é psicólogo da Empresa Pública de Transporte e Circulação. Atua desde 2009 na área de Psicologia Organizacional. Tem experiência em Avaliação Psicológica, Recrutamento e Seleção, Avaliação de Desempenho, Acompanhamento Funcional, Análise de Cargos, Psicoterapia Adulta e Infantil, Psicologia Escolar e Ensino Religioso. Seus principais pontos de interesse são: Afetividade, Arte, Cultura, Educação, Intencionalidade, Moralidade, Saúde, Sentido e Valor.

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